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Abstract
This paper studies the relation between macroeconomic ﬂuctuations and corporate de-
faults while conditioning on industry aﬃliation and an extensive set of ﬁrm-speciﬁcf a c t o r s .
Using a logit approach on a panel data set for all incorporated Swedish businesses over 1990-
2002, we ﬁnd strong evidence for a substantial and stable impact of aggregate ﬂuctuations.
Macroeﬀects diﬀer across industries in an economically intuitive way. Out-of-sample eval-
uations show our approach is superior to both models that exclude macro information and
best ﬁtting naive forecasting models. While ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors are useful in ranking ﬁrms’
relative riskiness, macroeconomic factors capture ﬂuctuations in the absolute risk level.
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The start-up and closing of businesses are two of the very fundamental events in economic life.
Their rates of occurrence are associated with innovation and growth, and economic slowdowns,
or even downturns, respectively. In spite of their fundamental importance, our understanding
of these events is far from complete; little is known about the extent to which macroeconomic
conditions inﬂuence the likelihood of start-ups and closings taking place. Recent economic
events in the world economy, and the U.S. in particular, have once more conﬁrmed that our
understanding of the mechanisms by which and the extent to which the fortunes of businesses
are inﬂuenced by broader economic conditions is still far from perfect. This is reﬂected in
the diﬃculties economists experience in predicting the development of the economy in times
of economic distress, in part due to a limited understanding of microeconomic responses to
aggregate ﬂuctuations.
The aim of this paper is to shed more light on the dynamics of business defaults and, in
particular, the interaction between macroeconomic ﬂuctuations on the one hand, and the ﬁrms’
individual likelihood as well as the aggregate rate of default on the other hand. For this purpose
we employ a new panel data set with detailed ﬁrm-level information on all incorporated Swedish
businesses over the period 1990Q1-2002Q4. The panel contains more than 10 million data points
and an average of over 200,000 ﬁrms per point in time. The length and width of this panel allow
us to do several things that previous work has been unable to carry out. Among other things
we can consider industry-speciﬁce ﬀects of macroeconomic ﬂuctuations and do extensive out-of
sample testing of our models in both the cross-sectional and time-series dimensions.
Econometric studies of business defaults and bankruptcy risk started in the 1960s with work
by Altman and coauthors (1968,1971,1973,1984,1985). These papers focused on explaining
bankruptcies or defaults of publicly quoted businesses in a cross-sectional context with the help
of a small set of ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables. Later work by Shumway (2001) explicitly models the
time-dimension of defaults by means of a simple duration model. Jacobson, Lindé and Roszbach
(2005) show how micro-econometric models of default can be incorporated into empirical macro
models to capture the interaction between the real and ﬁnancial part of the economy. Bharath
and Shumway (2008) evaluate the out-of-sample accuracy of the Merton (1974) model and ﬁnd
that the distance-to-default measure is not a suﬃcient statistic for the probability of default.
Over time the average default frequency and individual default probabilities display substan-
tial variation, in a way that suggests co-movement with macroeconomic and ﬁnancial variables.
1For aggregate default rates in the U.S. corporate bond market, the importance of macroeconomic
conditions is well-documented by Blume, Keim and Patel (1991), Jonsson and Fridson (1996)
and Helwege and Kleiman (1997). However, relatively little eﬀort has been made to investigate
the importance of macroeconomic ﬂuctuations for business defaults, particularly for privately
held companies. Recent work by Duﬃe, Saita and Wang (2007), Carling, Jacobson, Lindé and
Roszbach (2007), Pesaran, Schuermann, Treutler and Weiner (2006) and Jacobson, Lindé and
Roszbach (2005) provides some ﬁrst empirical evidence that ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors alone cannot
fully explain the variation in corporate default rates and the term structure of default probabili-
ties. In these studies adding macroeconomic information contributes to explaining the likelihood
of defaults. Using panel data on listed U.S. industrial ﬁrms, Duﬃee ta l .( 2007) ﬁnd that macro
variables, such as GDP growth and personal income growth, and ﬁrm size have no signiﬁcant
explanatory power for bankruptcy and default rates. Their model uses the distance-to-default
as well as the trailing one-year stock return as ﬁrm-speciﬁc controls and the three-month T-bill
rate and the one-year S&P 500 return as macro-ﬁnancial covariates. Duﬃee ta l .(2007) attain
out-of-sample accuracy rates of over 80%.1 Carling et al. (2007) document the signiﬁcance of
macroeconomic variables for Swedish loan defaults. Pesaran et al. (2006) focus on setting up
a model that links credit losses to macroeconomic variables and use a large number of macro
variables in a GVAR model to generate changes in Merton-model default probabilities for a
hypothetical loan portfolio. Jacobson et al. (2005) follow a similar approach but link macro
variables to a reduced-form model of loan defaults. Hackbarth, Miao and Morellec (2006) pro-
vide a ﬁrst theoretical model of the mechanism through which macroeconomic conditions aﬀect
default risk. They argue that when cash ﬂows depend on economic conditions, ﬁrms’ optimal
default thresholds will be aﬀected by aggregate shocks. Hence aggregate shocks can trigger
simultaneous defaults.
1Duﬃe et al. base their bankruptcy deﬁnition on the coding system in the Moody’s database. This includes
the following events: Bankruptcy, Bankruptcy Section 77, Chapter 10, Chapter 11, Chapter 7, and Prepackaged
Chapter 11. A bankruptcy is also recorded when Compustat indicates Chapter 11 or Chapter 7. In some cases
they record bankruptcy based on information from Bloomberg or other data sources. Defaults (see below) that
eventually led to bankruptcies are sometimes not counted as bankruptcy exits if such a default was triggered
earlier than the bankruptcy, for example by a missed debt payment. Defaults are deﬁned as the occurrence
of a bankruptcy as above or any of the following additional default types in the Moody’s database: distressed
exchange, dividend omission, grace-period default, indenture modiﬁed, missed interest payment, missed principal
and interest payments, missed principal payment, payment moratorium, and suspension of payments. They also
encompass any defaults recorded in Bloomberg and other data sources.
2This paper is probably closest to Duﬃee ta l .(2007), although we adopt a diﬀerent method-
ology and use a very diﬀerent data set. Our ﬁndings are consistent with those in Duﬃee ta l .
and most of the above-mentioned literature, but we are able to make several new contributions.
First, we have access to an unusually large panel data set that includes all incorporated Swedish
ﬁrms for a period covering several economic upturns and downturns. Hence our ﬁndings provide
insights into the signiﬁcance of aggregate ﬂuctuations for both listed and privately held ﬁrms,
the latter group typically being responsible for over half of GDP in developed economies. This
feature is of importance because Merton-like models of default, which are based on stock price
information, can only be applied to listed companies.2 Second, we can make use of a nearly
exhaustive set of ﬁrm-speciﬁc background variables. This allows us to look carefully at the im-
portance of and interaction between ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables and macroeconomic information - an
area that is more or less unexplored. Having access to a large set of ﬁrm speciﬁc controls makes
it possible to eliminate any chance that the empirical signiﬁcance of macro variables for default
probabilities is (partially) an artifact of a shortage of ﬁrm-speciﬁc controls. Third, the length
of our panel enables us to do extensive out-of-sample performance tests of our model.3 Finally,
the width of our panel permits us to investigate the relation between aggregate ﬂuctuations and
ﬁrm-defaults across industries. By isolating and comparing industry-speciﬁce ﬀects of macro
aggregates we get an additional measure of the robustness of the impact these macro variables
have on business defaults.
We adopt a standard econometric speciﬁcation and estimate logistic regressions on ﬁrm-
level default risk.4 In addition to an extensive set of ﬁnancial statement variables and payment
remarks, reﬂecting a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial track record, we include four standard macroeconomic vari-
ables. The default risk models are estimated both at an economy-wide level and for industries
at the one-digit level on the sub-sample covering 1990Q1 − 1999Q4.F o r t h i s p e r i o d , w e h a v e
8,106,138 observations on roughly 250,000 ﬁrms. We assess the in-sample ﬁto ft h ee s t i m a t e d
models along with a thorough examination of the models’ out-of-sample performance over the
period 2000Q1 − 2002Q4. Because the aggregate default frequency and macroeconomic aggre-
2In developed countries, privately held businesses’ share of GDP typically exceeds 50 percent. Ayyagari, Beck
and Demirguc-Kunt (2007) report that the share of SME’s in GDP is between 50 percent and 60 percent in both
Sweden and the United States. Hence, since a substantial share of large ﬁrms are privately-held, it is safe to infer
that the share of all privately held ﬁrms is likely to be greater than the share of SME’s alone. See also Kobe
(2007).
3Duﬃe et al. (2007) do out-of sample tests for the subset of listed industrial ﬁrms.
4See Altman and Saunders (1997) for references.
3gates displayed a substantial amount of volatility during the 1990s, we consider the out-of-sample
tests as an important step in our assessment of the extent to which our model can be viewed
as causal. Out-of-sample accuracy for the economy-wide and the industry models lends support
for our hypothesis that aggregate ﬂuctuations are important for understanding default behavior
at the ﬁrm level, over and above the eﬀect of an extensive set of ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors.
Our main ﬁndings are as follows. First, we ﬁnd that macroeconomic variables are important
for explaining the time-varying likelihood of default. Firm-speciﬁc variables are very useful for
ranking ﬁrms according to their relative riskiness, but macroeconomic variables are of crucial
importance for explaining variation in the level of default risk over time. Second, our analysis also
suggests that considering only macro variables while ignoring relevant ﬁrm-speciﬁci n f o r m a t i o n
leads to a substantial loss of out-of-sample accuracy. Third, the quantitative eﬀects of aggregate
ﬂuctuations in the industry-speciﬁc models are such that they support the notion that the
macro factors we consider have truly causal eﬀects. For example, demand and interest rate
conditions have a particularly strong impact on the construction and real-estate sectors while the
dependence of the agricultural sector on the macroeconomic stance is relatively weak. Fourth,
we show that models estimated on cross-sectional data suﬀer from a substantial parameter
instability. Fifth, we document that the estimated default risk models perform very well out-
of-sample, along the cross-sectional and the time-series dimensions as well as at the aggregate
and the industry levels. As may be expected, industry-speciﬁc models typically have a clear
edge over a single economy-wide model when evaluated at the industry level. However, when
evaluated at an economy-wide level, this advantage more or less vanishes. By and large, we
think these ﬁndings are of great interest, since they imply that even economic outcomes that are
generated in a period with extreme aggregate ﬂuctuations, such as the Swedish banking crisis
in the early 1990s, can be captured by a default risk model with constant parameters over time.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we present our
micro and macro data sets. The logistic regression results are presented in Section 3 for two
versions of the model, one where only ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables are included and another where the
model is extended with macroeconomic variables. We also compare the industry-speciﬁcm o d e l s
with the estimation results of an economy-wide model, and make an assessment of the in-sample
ﬁt of the estimated models. In Section 4, we undertake a thorough out-of-sample investigation
of the estimated models along three dimensions: i)t h eﬁt of the models in terms of adjusted
R2, ii) the root mean squared prediction errors and iii) the accuracy of the default risk ranking.
4The former two measures are studied at the industry and the economy-wide level, while the
latter criterion is an assessment of the microeconomic relevance. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2D a t a
In this section we will, at some length, discuss the very large micro data set at hand. We also
brieﬂy cover the macro data.
2.1 Micro data
The ﬁrm data set is a panel consisting of 10,720,386 quarterly observations on the stock of
Swedish aktiebolag,o rﬁrms, between January 1, 1990, and December 31, 2002, hence covering a
period of 13 years. Aktiebolag are by approximation the Swedish equivalent of US corporations
and UK limited liability businesses. Swedish law requires every aktiebolag to have at least SEK
100,000 (approximately US$ 15,000) of equity to be eligible for registration at Bolagsverket,
the Swedish Companies Registration Oﬃce (SCRO). Swedish corporations are also required to
submit an annual report to the SCRO. Although the corporate sector in Sweden also includes
small ﬁrms such as general partnerships, limited partnerships, and sole proprietors, we will not
include them in the analyses for a number of reasons. First, these ﬁrms do not submit yearly
ﬁnancial statements and hence require model speciﬁcations that do not involve ﬁnancial ratios.
Second, the incorporated ﬁrms that we model account for an overwhelmingly large fraction of
Swedish bank loans to ﬁrms. Third, corporations display a more pronounced cyclical variation
in default risk; see Jacobson and Lindé (2000).
The ﬁrm data have been obtained from Upplysningscentralen AB (UC), the leading credit
bureau in Sweden, independently operated but jointly owned by the Swedish banks. The UC
data come from two general sources. The ﬁrst concerns balance-sheet and income-statement
data from the ﬁrms’ compulsory annual reports submitted to the SCRO. These annual report
data cover the period January 1, 1989, to December 31, 2002, and the format is in accordance
with European Union standards.
The second information source is atypical in the default literature and somewhat unique for
Sweden. The credit bureau systematically collects information about events related to ﬁrms’
payment behavior from all relevant sources, e.g., the Swedish retail banks, the Swedish tax au-
5thorities, and the institutions that deal with the legal formalities in ﬁrms´ bankruptcy processes.5
The credit bureau thus has a register of more than 60 diﬀerent payment remarks concerning
foremost credit and tax-related events but also records of various steps in the legal procedures
leading up to formal bankruptcy. The information in the register involves a ﬂag for the occur-
rence of an event in the form of a date and the amount of due payment (if applicable). Some
examples of registered events are delays in tax payments, the repossession of delivered goods, the
seizure of property, the restructuring of loans, and actual bankruptcy. The storage and usage of
payment remarks are regulated by the Credit Information Act and the Personal Data Act are
overseen by the Swedish Data Inspection Board. Payment remarks turn out to be powerful pre-
dictors of default in practice. With a record of remarks individuals will usually not be granted
any new bank loans, and businesses can ﬁnd it very diﬃcult to open new lines of credit.
For this study, we deﬁne the population of existing ﬁrms in quarter t as the ﬁrms that have
issued a ﬁnancial statement covering that quarter and are classiﬁed as “active,” i.e., the ﬁrm has
reported total sales and total assets in excess of 1,000 SEK (roughly US$ 150). However, since
there are ﬁrms that neglect to fulﬁl their reporting obligation, a behavior typically associated
with distress, we would miss an important segment of ﬁrms by only considering those that
submit annual reports regularly. Hence we will add the ﬁrms that, according to the data set
with payment remarks, are classiﬁed as defaulted ﬁrms in quarter t.M a n y ﬁrms that default
choose not to submit their compulsory annual reports in that year or even for a number of years
prior to default. Hence, the only records of their existence that we have come from the payment
remark registers. We adopt the following deﬁnition of a default: a ﬁrm has default status if
any of the following events has occurred: the ﬁrm is declared legally bankrupt, has suspended
payments, has negotiated a debt composition settlement, is undergoing a re-construction, or is
distraint without assets. More details on the construction of the default variable are provided
in the Appendix.
In Table 1, we report the means and standard deviations for a set of accounting ratios,
payment remarks, and a variable that measures the average elapsed time since the last issued
ﬁnancial report. The table distinguishes between defaulted and non-defaulted ﬁrms, at the
aggregate as well as the industry level, for the in-sample period 1990Q1 − 1999Q4,t h a ti s ,t h e
sub-sample period for which we will specify and estimate all subsequent models. The out-of-
5District courts, the Swedish Enforcement Authority, the Swedish Companies Registration Oﬃce, and debt
collection ﬁrms, among others.
6sample period, 2000Q1 − 2002Q4, is saved to allow for extensive model-evaluation exercises.
Analyses of industry eﬀects will be conducted at the one-digit level to ensure suﬃciently many
default observations in each industry in both the cross-sectional and the time series dimensions.
The ten industries are; agriculture, manufacturing, construction, retail, hotel and restaurant,
transportation, banking, ﬁnance and insurance, real-estate, consulting and rental, and ﬁnally a
residual industry labelled "not classiﬁed".
Because of the varying availability of data, the statistics in Table 1 are calculated based on
slightly diﬀerent numbers of observations for the variables in a given industry. Dealing with micro
data sets of this size invariably involves dealing with outliers. As indicated by the large standard
errors in Panel A of Table 1, showing non-winsorized data, there are some accounting data
observations that clearly are severe outliers. These observations would distort the estimation
results if they were to be included in the logit model and therefore, we have winsorized the top
and bottom 1 percent observations for the accounting variables in each industry.6 Given the
large number of observations in our data set, this approach is practically more or less equivalent
to simply deleting 1 percent of the observations that have accounting data that fall outside a
certain region. Note that we choose to winsorize the observations in each industry separately,
rather than at the aggregate level, thereby implicitly allowing for dispersion and diﬀerent means
in diﬀerent industries. Panel B of Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the truncated
micro data set.7
In deciding on the set of ﬁnancial ratios in Table 1, we evaluated a larger number of frequently
used ratios in often-cited articles on bankruptcy risk and the balance-sheet channel.8 The six
ﬁnancial ratios reported show the strongest correlations with our deﬁnition and measure of
default: earnings before interest, depreciation, taxes and amortization (EBITDA) over total
assets (TA) (earnings ratio); interest payments (IP) over the sum of interest payments and
earnings before interest, depreciation, taxes and amortization (interest coverage ratio); total
liabilities (TL) over total assets (leverage ratio); total liabilities over total sales (TS) (debt
6 W i n s o r i z a t i o ni sq u i t ec o m m o ni nt h el i t e r a t u r eu s i n gﬁnancial ratios to avoid outliers that are created by
near-zero denominators. Shumway (2001) winsorizes the top and bottom 1 percent of all observations. It should
be emphasized that the results are robust to varying the winsorization rate between 0.5 and 2 percent.
7 From Table 1, comparison of the descriptive statistics for the unwinsorized data makes it clear that defaulted
ﬁrms are disproportionally more aﬀected when winsorizing all observations jointly. Since the PAYREMARK,
TAXARREARS, PAYDIV and TTLFS are dummy variables that are unaﬀected by choice of winsorization proce-
dure, a joint one could lead to underestimation of the importance of the accounting data variables in the default
risk model relative to these dummy variables. To check the robustness of our chosen approach, we used an alterna-
tive approach where we truncated the healthy and defaulted ﬁrms separately. As expected, the estimation results
of the default-risk model with this alternative winsorization suggest a somewhat larger role for the accounting
ratios, but the overall picture remains the same.
8 See Altman (1969, 1971, 1973, 1984), Carling et al. (2007), Frydman, Altman and Kao (1985), and Shumway
(2001).
7ratio); liquid assets (LA) in relation to total liabilities (quick ratio); and inventories (I) over total
sales (inventory turnover ratio).9 These six ratios were selected following a two-step procedure.
First, the univariate relationship between the ratio and default risk was investigated. By visual
inspection, ratios that lacked any correlation with default risk were eliminated from the set of
candidate explanatory variables. Figure 1 illustrates this for the six selected ratios by comparing
default rates (solid line) and the cumulative distributions of the variables (dotted line) for all
observations in the panel 1990Q1 − 1999Q4. The default rate for a given observation of a ratio
is calculated as an average over the interval of +/- 5000 adjacent observations in the empirical
distribution of the ratio at hand. Given the density of the observations, there is a positive
relationship between default and the leverage, interest coverage and turnover ratios, while the
ﬁgure suggests a negative relationship for both the debt and the liquidity ratios. The diagrams
in Figure 1 suggest that the relationship between default and the earnings ratio, total liability
over total sales ratio and interest costs over the sum of interest costs and earnings are non-linear.
For instance, for the interest coverage variable, this relationship is perhaps what one would have
expected. The ratio can turn highly negative if earnings are negative and slightly larger than
interest payments in absolute value, which is intuitively associated with an increased risk of
default. On the other tack, large interest payments and low earnings will also make this ratio
large, which is likewise associated with an increased default risk. Similar reasoning can be be
applied to the other ratios. What is important to note is that this non-linear feature of some
ﬁnancial ratios does not imply that these variables are uninformative for default risk in the
empirical models, even when entered linearly in the logit model. The reason for this is that the
co-variation between these ﬁnancial ratios in the cross section is substantial, which makes each
of these variables contribute to predicting default risk in the joint empirical model.10 Taking
these insights into account, Figure 1 conﬁrms the picture emerging from Table 1: there is a
clear diﬀerence between healthy and defaulted ﬁrms for these variables. In the accounting data,
we also have information on whether a ﬁrm has paid out dividends to shareholders or not. We
therefore include this information as a dummy variable (PAYDIV) in the model, taking a value
of one if the ﬁrm paid out dividends and zero otherwise.
As mentioned previously, some ﬁrms classiﬁed as active or defaulted did not submit a ﬁnancial
9 It should be noted that the level of debt, in addition to the leverage ratio (TLi,t/TAi,t)f o rﬁrm i in period
t, contains predictive power for default. We therefore decided to include TLi,t as a separate variable, but scaled
it with average total sales in period t to obtain a stationary ratio. Thus, the debt-to-sales ratio is deﬁned as
TLi,t/TSt,where TSt denotes average total sales in period t.
10 For instance, taking the square of the interest coverage ratio, which, judging by Figure 1, would seem
appropriate in a single-variable analysis, reduces the explanatory power of this variable in the multivariate model.
8report in every period, leading to a missing observation problem. Rather than excluding such
ﬁrms from the sample, we replace missing values by imputing the panel mean for the joint set
of defaulted/non-defaulted ﬁrms. In order to capture the relationship between the failure to a
ﬁnancial statement and subsequent default, we also include a dummy variable, denoted TTLFS,
which equals unity if a ﬁrm has not issued a ﬁnancial statement one and a half years prior to
the current quarter, and zero otherwise.11 By comparing defaulting and healthy ﬁrms in Table
1 we see that this mechanism is at work in the panel.
For the remark variables, we employ the same approach as in Carling et al. (2007) and use
simple dummy variables by setting them to unity if certain remarks existed for the ﬁrm during
the year prior to quarter t, and 0 otherwise. An intuitively reasonable starting point was to ﬁnd
remark events that (i) lead default in time as much as possible and (ii) are highly correlated
with default. As it turns out, many payment remark variables are either contemporaneously
correlated with default or lack a signiﬁcant correlation with default behavior. For our ﬁnal model,
we constructed the PAYREMARK variable as a composite dummy of four events: "a bankruptcy
petition," "the issuance of a court order - because of absence during the court hearing - to pay
a debt," "the seizure of property," and ”having a non-performing loan." The TAXARREARS
variable reﬂects whether the ﬁrm is in various tax arrears. It should be emphasized, although
it is evident from Panel B in Table 1, that the constructed payment remark variables that we
consider do not automatically imply a subsequent default incident, so there are no tautological
issues involved in using these variables to predict default events.
There is some, but not very much, variation in the average ﬁnancial ratios and payment
remark variables across industries, and in general the diﬀerences between defaulted and non-
defaulted ﬁrms display similar patterns in all industries. So, for example, in Table 1, panel B, we
see that the shares of defaulted ﬁrms that have received payment remarks are around 0.15 and
0.45, respectively, whereas corresponding shares for non-defaulted ﬁrms are 0.00 and 0.03. The
hotel and restaurant industry is the outlier. Hence, these ﬁrms have the lowest earnings ratios,
largest debt ratios, greatest occurrences of payment remarks and least of dividend payments,
11 Three things worth noting in connection with the deﬁnition of TTLFS. First, this information is assumed
to be available with a 6-quarter time lag, since ﬁnancial statements for year τ are typically available in the third
quarter of year τ +1 . By letting this dummy variable equal unity with a 6-quarter time lag in relevant cases,
we account for the real-time delay. Second, given the way we deﬁne the population of existing ﬁrms, ﬁrms that
recently registered and entered into the panel would automatically be assigned TTLFS = 1 in the third quarter
of their existence, since they have not, of course, issued any ﬁnancial statement prior to entering. For these new
ﬁrms, TTLFS has been set to 0 and the accounting data variables have been taken from their ﬁrst yearly balance
sheet and income statement. Third, for defaulting ﬁrms that are in the panel but on no occassion submitted
an annual report, we also set TTLFS equal to 0. This is the case for 49,202 out of 123,023 defaulting ﬁrms in
the panel. So, although TTLFS turns out to be very important in the default-risk model, by construction the
importance of this variable is down-played rather than exaggerated.
9and as a consequence, the largest default rate over all.
2.2 Macro data
In this paper, we will make use of the same macrodata set as in earlier work, (see Jacobson et
al. (2005)) and consider the output gap (i.e., the deviation of GDP from its trend value), the
yearly inﬂation rate (measured as the fourth diﬀerence of the GDP deﬂator), the REPO nominal
interest rate (a short-term interest rate, set by the Riksbank ), and the real exchange rate.12
The output-gap series is by construction a detrended variable. Since the real exchange rate is
also characterized by a strong trend during the sample period, this variable is detrended as well
in order to allow for a closer relationship with ﬁrm default. Since Sweden is a small and open
economy with a large foreign trade sector, one should consider the importance of conditioning
on foreign variables in the empirical analyses as well. Our results suggest that while foreign
variables are an important source of ﬂuctuations in Swedish macro variables (see Lindé, 2002),
it is not necessary to condition directly on foreign variables in the default risk models if the
above-mentioned domestic variables are included. The aggregate time series are depicted in
Figure 2.13
In the output-gap series in Figure 2 there is clear evidence of the deep recession in the
beginning of the 1990s with a negative output gap of more than 4 percent in 1993. The general
economic improvement of 1994-1996 is also evident. This can also be seen in the inﬂation and
interest rate series that both peak in the early 90s and then come down in the recovery phase.
3 The default-risk models: Estimation and in-sample ﬁt
In this section, we examine if default risk at the ﬁrm level is aﬀected by aggregate ﬂuctua-
tions over and above the set of ﬁrm-speciﬁc information that we have at our disposal for all
incorporated ﬁrms.
We study the in-sample gains of estimating separate models for each industry and assess the
role of aggregate ﬂuctuations for improving the models’ ﬁt. The in-sample period is chosen to
be 1990Q1 − 1999Q4.
12 The real exchange rate is measured as the nominal TCW-weighted (TCW= trade competitive weights)
exchange rate times the TCW-weighted foreign price level (CPI deﬂators) divided by the domestic CPI deﬂator.
13 The macro data set has been adopted from Lindé (2002) and is based on an estimated vector autoregressive
model (VAR) for Sweden and the period 1986Q3−2002Q4. The trends for the variables are estimated by means
of a dynamic simulation of the estimated VAR under the assumption of no shocks hitting the equations. The
detrended variables are then computed as actual values minus the trend values. It should be noted, however, that
using HP-ﬁltered data for output and the real exchange rate produces very similar results to those reported.
103.1 The default-risk models
The reduced-form statistical model that we employ for estimating probabilities of default for
all Swedish incorporated ﬁrms is similar to the logit approach used in Shumway (2001), and in
Jacobson, Lindé and Roszbach (2005). The speciﬁcation includes both ﬁrm-speciﬁc( xi,t)a n d
macroeconomic explanatory variables (zt). Using a reduced-form model both avoids the problem
that the Merton (1974) model cannot be implemented for privately held companies without very
strong assumptions and enables us to use a uniﬁed approach for all businesses, both privately
and publicly held. Our approach is consistent with the theoretical ideas in Hackbarth, Miao
and Morellec (2007), who argue that aggregate shocks can trigger simultaneous defaults. Thus
we propose to estimate the following model:




1 if xi,tβ + ztγ + εi,t ≥ 0 (ﬁrm defaults)
0 if xi,tβ + ztγ + εi,t < 0 (ﬁrm stays in business)
,
under the assumption that the vector of ﬁrm-speciﬁc regressors (i.e. xi,t) and the macroeconomic
variables we consider (collected in the vector zt) are stochastically independent w.r.t. the error
term εi,t. We also make the assumption that the errors are independent between both ﬁrms and
time points, i.e., f (εi,t,ε j,t)=f (εi,t)f (εj,t) for i 6= j and f (εi,t,ε i,t+p)=f (εi,t)f (εi,t+p) for
p 6=0 .
We use standard macro variables in the model: a measure of the output gap, the domes-
tic yearly inﬂation rate, the REPO rate (a short-term nominal interest rate controlled by the
Swedish central bank), and the real exchange rate. These variables are depicted in Figure 2.
Although the literature does not oﬀer a strong theoretical basis for selecting macro variables, we
think a priori that these variables could credibly have measurable impact on the default risk of
any given ﬁrm. The output gap is intended as an indicator of demand conditions, i.e., increased
demand in the economy is expected to reduce default risk. We also include the nominal interest
rate in zt because credit conditions facing ﬁrms, in particular ﬁrms in distress, are likely to be
tightly linked to levels of the interest rate. In addition, the nominal interest rate displayed con-
siderable variation during the recession in the early 1990s but has since come down substantially,
after the adoption of an inﬂation target in Sweden.14 Given the fact that the exports-to-GDP-
ratio in Sweden is around 0.40, the real exchange rate is also a potentially important variable, a
14 T h eR E P Or a t ew a se x t r e m e l yh i g hi nt h et h i r dq u a rter of 1992 due to the Riksbank having raised the
so-called marginal interest rate to 500 percent, unexpectedly and temporarily, in an attempt to defend the ﬁxed
11deprecation rendering improved competitiveness to Swedish ﬁrms. The inﬂation rate may also
be important for ﬁrms’ pricing decisions; higher inﬂation rates are associated with less certainty
about correct relative prices and may thus lead to potentially higher default risks.
3.2 Estimation results
To document how aggregate variables contribute to the default risk models, we present estima-
tion results for two speciﬁcations: one with and one without macroeconomic variables. Moreover,
results are presented for ten industry-speciﬁc models, as well as an economy-wide model (all ﬁrms
in all industries jointly modelled), and also results achieved by aggregating across the industry
models using industry size as weights.
Table 2 contains estimation results for a model with ﬁrm-speciﬁc determinants of default
risk only (i.e., the six ﬁnancial ratios augmented with the dummy variables PAYDIV, TTLFS,
PAYREMARK, and TAXARREARS), while Table 3 shows results with the macroeconomic
variables added.
Since the ﬁrms’ annual ﬁnancial reports are typically submitted with a signiﬁcant time lag,
it cannot in general be assumed that accounting data for year τ are available during, or even at
the end of, year τ and enable forecasted default risks for the year τ +1. To account for this, we
have lagged all accounting data by 4 quarters in the estimations. For most ﬁrms, which report
balance-sheet and income-statement data over calendar years, this means that data for year τ
are assumed to have been available in the ﬁrst quarter of year τ +1 . It should be emphasized
that our decision to lag the accounting data 4 quarters in the estimation in order to make the
model “operational” in real time has minor implications for the estimated coeﬃcients. When
re-estimating the model using contemporaneous data instead, the estimation results were found
to be very similar to the ones reported in Tables 2 and 3.15
exchange rate. If the REPO rate is not adjusted for this exceptional event, the estimation procedure would lead
to underestimation of the importance of ﬁnancial costs for default behavior. We therefore decided to adjust the
REPO rate series in the third quarter of 1992. The estimated dummy coeﬃcient in the VAR that we used to
compute the output gap and the real exchange rate gap equals 28.2 in the REPO-rate equation. On the basis of
this, we have adjusted the REPO rate for this quarter to equal 9.8 percent instead of 38 percent.
15 In addition to the coeﬃcients reported in Tables 2 and 3, three more variables were included (but not
reported). First, an industry-speciﬁc intercept. Second, since the bankcruptcy rate is systematically lower in
the third quarter (most likely due to Swedish courts’ summer holiday period in July-August), a seasonal dummy
is included to capture this phenonemon. Third, because no data on the payment records of ﬁrms (i.e., the
dummy variables PAYREMARK and TAXARREARS) exist prior to 1992Q3 for legal storage reasons, the models
also include one additional variable common to all i ﬁrms that is constructed to be an estimate of the average
value of the sum of the payment record variables PAYREMARK and TAXARREARS for the quarters 1990Q1-
1992Q2. This variable was constructed by estimating a logit model for the event of either of the dummy variables
PAYREMARK and TAXARREARS taking on the value 0 or 1 for the period 1992Q3-1999Q2,u s i n ga l lt h e
variables in the model in Table 3 as regressors (except PAYREMARK and TAXARREARS, of course). The
imputed average value for this variable for the period 1990Q1-1992Q2 (after 1992Q2,i ti ss e tt on i l )w a st h e n
12The results in Table 2 show that the ﬁrm-speciﬁc information we consider is indeed important
for explaining default behavior in both the industry-speciﬁc models and in the economy-wide
model. In particular, the indicator variable TTLFS (which takes a value of 1 if a ﬁrm has not
ﬁled an annual report on time, and 0 otherwise) and the variables for remarks on ﬁrms’ payment
records are very powerful predictors of default. Among the ﬁnancial ratios we ﬁnd the leverage
ratio and the debt ratios TL/TA and TL/TS as well as the earnings ratio to be quite useful.16
However, the turnover ratio, the quick ratio, and the interest coverage ratio appear to be less
important. Moreover, the roles played by ﬁnancial ratios in the various industry models diﬀer
substantially; while accounting data are less important in the ﬁnancial services (bank, ﬁnance
and insurance) sector, it is more important in the manufacturing industry. In the hotel and
restaurant sector, we ﬁnd that the I/TS coeﬃcient is large, whereas it is zero, or even negative,
in the agriculture and construction industries, respectively. The coeﬃcients for the payment
remarks and the indicator variable TTLFS are quite similar across industries. So to the extent
that these variables are the more important ones for explaining ﬁrm default behavior, there
is no clear gain at the ﬁrm-speciﬁc level from conditioning on industry. Finally, a reassuring
feature of the results in Tables 2 and 3 is that the coeﬃcients for the ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables do
not change substantially when the model is augmented with the macroeconomic variables. In
particular, coeﬃcients for the ﬁnancial ratios in Table 2 are in general very similar to the ones
in Table 3.
Turning to the estimation results presented in Table 3 for models with the macroeconomic
variables included, we ﬁnd that all coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant in the economy-wide model, with
the exception of inﬂation, and have the expected signs.17 The notion of conditioning on macro-
economic variables in default risk modeling is given further support by the industry-speciﬁc




i ˆ pi,t where ˆ pi,t
denotes the estimated probability for ﬁrm i in period t to have either PAYREMARK or TAXARREARS greater
than zero, and Nt denotes the number of ﬁrms in period t. The largest gain in including this variable is that
presumably the eﬀects of macroeconomic variables in Table 3 are somewhat more accurately captured. For the
coeﬃcients of the ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables this imputation is of little consequence.
16 R e g a r d i n gt h ei m p o r t a n c eo ft h ea c c o u n t i n gd a t ai nt h em o d e l ,w ew o u l dl i k et oe m p h a s i z et h ef o l l o w i n g .
Firms issue annual ﬁnancial statements, which we transform into quarterly observations by assuming that the
variables for a ﬁrm remain constant over the quarters in a given reporting period. By deﬁning a default event at
quarterly frequency, our transformation procedure could potentially lead to underestimation of the importance of
the ﬁnancial statement variables in the default-risk model. As a robustness check we estimated the default-risk
models on an annual frequency instead and found that the coeﬃcients for the accounting variables are quite
similar for either frequency speciﬁcation. In the economy-wide model, only the coeﬃcients for the earnings ratio,
EBITDA/TA, and the leverage ratio, TL/TA, were found to be slightly lower/higher (−1.13/0.59 instead of
−0.95/0.49, respectively). The coeﬃcients for the other accounting variables were found to be very similar. As
for the indicator variables, TAXARREARS and TTLFS were found to be somewhat smaller in the annual model
(2.30/3.07 instead of 2.57/3.67, respectively), but the coeﬃcients for the other dummy variables PAYREMARK
and PAYDIV were basically unaﬀected.
17 Note that a larger value for the real exchange rate implies a depreciation and therefore a negative estimated
coeﬃcient for this variable implies that a depreciation on average reduces the risk of default at a given point in
time.
13model results. Table 3 shows that the impact of the macroeconomic factors is estimated to be
more important in the industries that are arguably more cyclical. In other words, the size of
macroeconomic eﬀects on default varies across industries in an intuitively reasonable way. For
instance, both the output gap and the nominal interest rate are relatively more important in the
construction and the real estate sectors in comparison with other industries, and the nominal
interest rate is also quite naturally found to be very important for the ﬁnancial services sector.
The macro variables inﬂation and the real exchange rate are less important from a quantitative
perspective, and in most industries coeﬃcients are not statistically signiﬁcant. However, it is
reassuring to ﬁnd that a depreciating real exchange rate (i.e., lower value, see Figure 2) is as-
sociated with a signiﬁcantly lower default risk in the manufacturing sector, which is the most
export-oriented industry. As a robustness check, we examined a model allowing for possibly non-
linear relationships between default and the ﬁnancial ratios and found that the macroeconomic
variables are still highly signiﬁcant and quantitatively important.18
Finally, we would like to emphasize that the gain in using ﬁrm-speciﬁc data for default-risk
modelling is substantial. OLS estimates (TSLS give very similar results) for a model of the
average quarterly default rate on average ﬁnancial ratios and the four macro variables are:






















































qt +ˆ udf ,t, (1)
R2 =0 .91, DW =2 .15, Sample: 1990Q1 − 1999Q4 (T =4 0 )
If we compare the point estimates for the economy-wide model in Table 3 with those in (1)
a b o v e ,w es e et h a tt h e yd i ﬀer substantially.19 In particular, the ratios I/TS, LA/TL and TL/TS
now enter with counterintuitive signs that have reversed relative to the results in Tables 2 and
3. However, the coeﬃcients for the two key macro variables, the output gap and the nominal
interest rate, are very similar to those reported in Table 3 for the economy-wide model. This
18 When estimating a model where the ﬁnancial ratios enter in a non-linear way (interaction dummies), we used
the cumulated distributions depicted in Figure 1 to categorize the variables (3 categories for each variable). For
instance, we classiﬁed EBITDA/TA into the decile-based categories 0−10, 10−90, 90−100, whereas TL/TA was
classiﬁed into the categories 0 − 75, 75 − 90, 90 − 100. This categorization resulted in an increase in pseudo R
2
from 0.35 to 0.42 in the economy-wide model in Table 3. In this model with non-linear balance-sheet variables, the
macroeconomic variables still enter highly signiﬁc a n t l ya n dw i t hc o e ﬃcients for the output gap and the nominal
interest rate that are very close to those in Table 3. This implies that the macroeconomic variables are still
essential for explaining the absolute level of default risk.
19 The aggregated model in (1) has been estimated without the dummy variables for payment remarks, dividends
and failure to submit a ﬁnancial statement (PAYREMARK, TAXARREARS, PAYDIV, and TTLFS) because they
do not enter signiﬁcantly.
14highlights our conclusion that the coeﬃcients for the macroeconomic variables are driven by
the time-series dimension of the panel. Since the average ﬁnancial ratios are quite smooth over
time, it is not surprising that we obtain spurious results when the ﬁrm-speciﬁc information is
aggregated. Moreover, some explanatory power is lost by aggregating data; the model in (1)
yields an R2 of 0.91, which can be directly compared with the aggregated ﬁt( s e eb e l o w )o ft h e
corresponding model in Table 3, R2 =0 .96.
3.3 Assessing the models’ in-sample ﬁt
The last rows in Tables 2 and 3 report on the number of observations, the mean log-likelihood
and the pseudo-R2. The latter measures the ability of the estimated models to explain default
at the ﬁrm level and is computed using the method of McFadden (1974).20 Another important
and interesting feature of the models is their aggregate performance over time, i.e., how well the
models account for the average default frequency. Hence, we report what we label as "aggregate"
or "industry" R2 0s. These are calculated by aggregating all the ﬁtted ﬁrm default probabilities
in a particular industry model for each quarter 1990Q1−1999Q4 and then using the resulting 40
time-series observations to compute the implied aggregate R2.21 To assess the gain in estimating
separate industry-speciﬁc models, we also report the pseudo- and industry-R2 values conditional
on the economy-wide model coeﬃcients instead of the industry model coeﬃcients.
By comparing Tables 2 and 3, we see that the pseudo-R2 is not much aﬀected by the condi-
tioning on macroeconomic factors in any of the industries, merely 1-2 percentage points. How-
ever, the industry-R2 is doubled and sometimes even more than doubled by the introduction
of macro variables. Thus, the ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables account for the cross-section of the default
distribution, while the macroeconomic variable si nt h em o d e lp l a yt h er o l eo fs h i f t i n gt h em e a n
of the default distribution in each period. This also implies that the model with ﬁrm-speciﬁc
information cannot capture the upturns and downturns in the average default rate over time.
This is visualized in Figure 3, where we plot the average default rate over time against the ﬁtted
values from the economy-wide models in Table 2 (without macro variables) and Table 3 (with
macro variables). The results to the right-hand side of the vertical line pertain to out-of-sample
results and will be discussed in greater detail in Section 4.1. According to Figure 3, the model
20 McFadden’s (1974) formula for the pseudo-R
2-measure is given by 1-
ln Lmodel
ln Lconstant ,w h e r elnLmodel denotes the
log-likelihood in the estimated, full model at hand and lnLconstant is the log-likelihood in an estimated model
with only a constant included.
21 The aggregated R
2 is thus calculated by running a regression of the actual average default rate on the ﬁtted
average default rate and a constant.
15with both micro and macro variables included appears indeed able to replicate the high de-
fault rate during the deep recession/banking crisis in the beginning of the 1990s, as well as the
downturn to very moderate default rates during the latter part of the sample. This conclusion
is conﬁrmed in Figure 4, where the industry average default rates are plotted together with
the average predicted default rates generated by the estimated models in Tables 2 and 3. This
ﬁnding is very interesting, because it suggests that the extreme default rates recorded during the
banking crisis in the early 1990s were not exceptional events that are uninformative in a model
context. Rather, they were consequences of unusually bad economic outcomes, both domesti-
cally and internationally.22 An additional feature of interest to note in Tables 2 and 3 is that the
fall in pseudo-R2 values associated with conditioning on the economy-wide model coeﬃcients is
distinct but limited, whereas the corresponding reduction in aggregate R2 is quite substantial.
This latter result is conﬁrmed in Figure 5, which shows the average industry default frequencies
along with the projected default frequencies using the economy-wide parameter estimates in
Table 3. In two cases - the agricultural and the bank, ﬁnance & insurance sectors - we note that
their industry-R2 outcomes are negative conditional on the economy-wide model coeﬃcients.
At ﬁrst sight this may seem strange, given that the industry-speciﬁcc o e ﬃcients in Table 3 are
not very diﬀerent from the economy-wide model coeﬃcients. However, as should be clear from
Figure 5, these seemingly inconsistent results are driven by the not-reported intercept, which
is larger in the economy-wide model compared with the sector models. Therefore it induces a
systematically over-prediction of default risk in relation to the actual risk in these sectors.
A conceivable objection to our claim on the importance of conditioning on macroeconomic
factors in default risk models is that the signiﬁcance of these variables simply reﬂects the fact
that the impact of the ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables changes over time. Accordingly the ﬁto ft h em o d e l s
with only ﬁrm-speciﬁc information would increase dramatically if one were to continuously re-
estimate the coeﬃcients of the Table 2-models using the most recent quarterly information,
thus making the macro variables redundant. Figure 6 displays the estimated coeﬃcients for the
ﬁnancial ratios when allowing for time variation in the economy-wide model.23 The coeﬃcients
22 Lindé (2002)s h o w st h a tas i g n i ﬁcant share of the variation in domestic macroeconomic variables is of foreign
origin.
23 In these cross-sectional regressions, we impose teh condition that the constant equals the estimated intercept
from the economy-wide model in Table 2. The latter model is estimated on the full sample over time and should
hence provide a reasonable estimate of the long-run average default level. If the constant is not restricted in the
cross-sectional regressions, a substantial amount of the variation in the default rate over time would simply be
explained by the intercept. Such variation in the intercept would constitute an improper basis for comparisons
with the models including macro variables, since by construction an aggregate R
2 of 100 percent would result. The
intercept variations would yield undesirable implications when using the model for scenarioanalysis. Note that
we can examine time-varying coeﬃcients only in the economy-wide model, because we do not have a suﬃciently
l a r g en u m b e ro fd e f a u l t si ne a c hq u a r t e rf o rs o m eo ft h eindustries.We do not report the results of the dummy
16for all ratios are highly unstable, switch sign over time - except for the earnings ratio - and do so
more pronouncedly toward the latter part of the sample. Moreover, we also ﬁnd it implausible
that earnings were less important during the early 1990s recession, when the default frequency
was high. Hence models with only ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables, which are frequently re-estimated,
will inevitably fail to produce adequate out-of-sample forecasts. These are not very appealing
features for a default-risk model. Therefore, although a continuously re-estimated model with
only ﬁrm-speciﬁc information will produce a similar-sized aggregate R2 as a macro-conditional
model estimated over time, it does not provide compelling evidence against the claim that
macroeconomic variables matter for default risk. To be convincing, a ﬁrm-speciﬁc model with
time-varying coeﬃcients requires an understanding of how the time variation in the coeﬃcients
comes about. This appears far-fetched given the economically implausible and irregular patterns
displayed in Figure 6. Much sooner one would believe that these patterns point at an omitted-
variables problem, namely, the omitted macro variables.
Finally, to further help us understand the role of macro variables for default risk, let us
approach the issue from an opposite angle and study the importance of ﬁrm-speciﬁcv a r i a b l e s
in the models. One way of demonstrating how much information we lose by omitting the micro
data, is to regress the average default frequency on the macroeconomic variables included in
Table 3. When doing so we obtain the following result24:










qt +ˆ udf ,t,
R2 =0 .85, DW =1 .43, Sample: 1990Q1 − 1999Q4 (T =4 0 ). (2)
When comparing this regression with the results in Table 3, we see that we loose about 10
percentage points of the explanatory power in comparison with the economy-wide model when
excluding the ﬁnancial statement variables. Moreover, omitting the ﬁrm-speciﬁci n f o r m a t i o n
introduces mis-speciﬁcation problems in (2) as indicated by the Durbin-Watson-statistic. This
is in contrast to the results in (1), which has a DW-statistic around 2 and hence displays no signs
of autocorrelation. The autocorrelation problem in (2) turns out to induce further problems in
out-of-sample stability, as documented in Section 4 (see Table 4). Our interpretation is that
omitting ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables when modeling default risk attributes too much of the variation
variables PAYDIV; TTLFS, PAYREMARK and TAXARREARS since they do not exhibit much time-variation.
24 Here, the dependent variable is deﬁned as a percentage probability of default, i.e., we have multiplied the
series in Figure 3 by 100 in order to make the resulting coeﬃcients easier to interpret.
17in default risk to the macroeconomic factors in-sample. Since the role of the macroeconomic
factors is exaggerated in the estimated model in (2), it will perform less well out-of-sample.
4 Out-of-sample properties of the estimated model
In this section we investigate the robustness of the results in the previous section by examining
t h eo u t - o f - s a m p l ep r o p e r t i e so ft h em o d e l so fT a b l e2a n dT a b l e3 .W eu s et h ep e r i o d2000Q1−
2002Q4, comprising a total of 2,614,248 ﬁrm observations in 12 quarters, for the out-of-sample
testing. We evaluate the models along two dimensions. First, we study the models’ properties
at the industry and aggregate level, i.e., we assess their ability to predict future average default
rates. The predictions we consider are static one-step-ahead forecasts. For this purpose we have
re-estimated all models with the macro variables dated t − 1, instead of period t as in the case
of Table 3, so that we do not have to forecast any of the explanatory variables. Second, we look
into the models’ properties in predicting future default events at the ﬁrm level.
4.1 Evaluating the models at the aggregate and industry level
In Figure 3 and Figures 4 − 5, the results to the right-hand side of the vertical bars show the
one-step-ahead, out-of-sample performances at the aggregate level and at the industry levels,
respectively. As can be seen from Figure 3, the out-of-sample ﬁt in the economy-wide model is
remarkably good. Turning to the performance of the industry models in Figure 4, we see that
most of the estimated industry models ﬁt the data very well. There are two cases, however,
where the models appear to overestimate the default frequency out-of-sample, signalling that
the relationship between aggregate ﬂuctuations and the ﬁrm default behavior in the sector
under consideration has changed. Perhaps not too surprisingly, the two sectors are the ones
displaying the highest and most volatile default frequencies during the banking crisis: the hotel
and restaurant industry and the real estate industry. So for these sectors, the transmission of
aggregate ﬂuctuations into default behavior appears to have changed to some extent.
Before drawing any ﬁrm conclusions, it should be noted that these two sectors contain
relatively few observations, suggesting that the poor out-of-sample properties could to some
degree be attributed to a small-sample problem. This explanation is supported by the fact that
the construction sector, which is about four (two) times larger than the hotel and restaurant (real
estate) sector and exhibits a strong dependence on aggregate ﬂuctuations according to Table
183, performs well out-of-sample. However, there are other industries that contain even fewer
observations than the hotel and restaurant and the real-estate sectors, such as the agricultural
and the ﬁnancial services sectors, but display considerably more stable default frequency patterns
throughout the whole sample period and, yet, are not inﬂuenced by macro-economic variables
to the same extent. The fact that only relatively small sectors perform worse out-of-sample
implies that there is no sign of over-prediction when weighting the predicted default probabilities
in each industry by their relative size in each period. This becomes clear when we plot the
resulting default frequency against the average default frequency in Figure 4 (see lower right
diagram). Moreover, by comparing the results in Figure 4 with those in Figure 5, we also see that
the out-of-sample ﬁt at the industry level is generally improved by adapting industry-speciﬁc
models compared to the single aggregate (economy-wide) model. However, at the aggregate level
(comparing lower right diagrams), aggregating the weighted results of all the estimated industry
models does not seem to oﬀer any gain in comparison to applying the single economy-wide model
for all sectors directly. We will be examining this in greater detail below.
In Table 4, we report on the root mean squared prediction errors (RMSEs), one-step-ahead,
for the estimated models of Tables 2 and 3. We also show results for three reference time series
models: a random walk model, a 4-quarter moving-average model, and the model estimated
on aggregate data with only macroeconomic data included (eq. 2, denoted “Industry OLS
macroregression”).25 The results in Table 4 pertain to default risk models that have been re-
estimated using macro variables that are lagged one quarter. This ensures that all models in
Table 4 have been estimated on the same information, thereby allowing for a fair comparison
between the logit and the time series models. In the “Industry OLS macroregression” models an
additional dummy for the third quarter is included. Finally, it is imperative to notice that the
RMSEs are shown in percent, i.e., the actual and ﬁtted default frequencies have been multiplied
with a factor of 100 before the prediction errors are calculated.
From inspection of Table 4, it is evident from the ﬁrst row in the lower panel that the eﬀect
on forecasting performance from conditioning on both macro and ﬁrm-speciﬁc information is
considerable. The largest gain is found for the economy-wide model where forecast precision
increases by as much as a factor of seven when we include macro variables. The corresponding
factors for the industry-speciﬁc models range between 2 and 5, disregarding the not classiﬁed
25 We also experimented with estimated AR(p), p =1 ,...4, models. These were found to be inferior to the
models reported here, presumably due to the downward shift in default frequencies between the in-sample and
out-of-sample periods.
19residual industry, where there is barely any improvement. This can be interpreted as evidence
of an eﬀect from macro variables over and above some spurious industry eﬀect, i.e., controlling
for industry belonging will not shut down the inﬂuence from macro variables. Moreover, the
industry-speciﬁc models generate lower RMSEs compared with the industry models conditional
on coeﬃcients from the economy-wide model in Table 3, except for the retail sector. In the retail
sector the industry-speciﬁcm o d e lh a sa nR M S Eo f0.12 percent and the industry model based
on economy-wide coeﬃcients has a much smaller RMSE of 0.05.
By and large, the above ﬁndings constitute evidence that the industry-speciﬁcm o d e l sa r e
not over-parameterized with respect to macroeconomic variables. Therefore it will typically
be worthwhile to work with an industry-speciﬁc model if the focus is on understanding default
behavior in a particular industry. However, if the interest is modeling aggregate default behavior
only, the economy-wide default model appears to suﬃce. This tentative conclusion can be drawn
from the two right-most columns of the second row in Table 4. There the diﬀerent industry
forecasts computed with the industry-speciﬁc models have been weighted to a forecast for the
aggregate default frequency. This results in a slightly higher RMSE in comparison with the
RMSE for the economy-wide model (0.066 and 0.0478, respectively). Although this diﬀerence
in RMSE is very low in comparison with the other models in absolute terms,i ti sr a t h e rh i g hi n
relative levels. This in its turn becomes clear from inspection of the RMSE ratios presented in
the second row of the lower panel (0.724). This begs the question as to why the industry models
are inferior to the economy-wide model in terms of out-of-sample forecasting performance for
the whole economy when they outperform the economy-wide model in almost every industry.
The diﬀerence can be shown to be driven by the relatively large retail industry, which suﬀers
from out-of-sample over-prediction for the industry-speciﬁc retail model. For the economy-wide
model (compare the graphs for Retail in Figures 4 and 5) such an over-prediction does not
occur.26
Comparing the industry models in Table 3 with the time series models, we also see that
while the random walk model is doing better in four out of ten sectors, and the four-quarter
moving-average speciﬁcation is better ﬁve out of ten times at the industry level, they are still
both clearly inferior to the aggregated industry models. This implies that they are also inferior
26 As a check of the validity of this claim we re-calculated the RMSE for the aggregated industry and economy-
wide models excluding the retail industry altogether. The results are 0.0469 for the industry aggregate model and
0.0525 for the economy-wide model. This conﬁr m st h a tt h er e t a i ls e c t o rh a sap o s i t i v ei n ﬂuence on the RMSE for
the economy-wide model and likewise a negative inﬂuence on the industry aggregate RMSE for the out-of-sample
period we consider here.
20in terms of RMSE ﬁt to the aggregate model speciﬁcation in Table 3 (which conditions on
aggregate ﬂuctuations). The models that are based on OLS regressions for average industry
default frequencies on the macro variables only (Industry OLS macro regressions, see eq. 2) also
perform poorly out-of-sample in comparison with the Table 3 models. As already discussed in
Section 3.3, the unfavorable performance out-of-sample for the models estimated on aggregated
variables only is most likely driven by the tendency for such models to erroneously attribute
too much of the ﬂuctuations in the default frequencies in-sample to ﬂuctuations in the macro
variables; this is a consequence of the ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables being incorrectly omitted.
To sum up, we have found strong evidence that the favorable ﬁt in-sample of the estimated
industry (and aggregate) models, conditional on macro variables, is preserved out-of-sample at
the industry and aggregate level. This suggests that the macroeconomic factors that enter into
the model are structural, and not merely improving the in-sample ﬁt of the models. An impor-
tant reason why the favorable out-of-sample performance is reassuring for the hypothesis that
aggregate variables matter is that the in-sample and the out-of sample periods taken together
cover several upturns and downturns in the Swedish economy. This is evident from the output-
gap series in Figure 2. Finally, we have also documented that there are only small gains in
terms of forecasting accuracy to be made by using industry-speciﬁc models rather than simply
an aggregate model, as long as an appropriate set of macroeconomic variables is included.
4.2 Evaluating the models at the ﬁrm and the industry level
In this subsection, we turn to the out-of-sample properties of the estimated models at the
micro level, i.e., their ability to predict default events at the ﬁrm level. In particular, we
evaluate the models’ performance in terms of ranking relative ﬁrm riskiness, as well as their
determination of ﬁrms’ absolute risk. In addition, for the out-of-sample period, we report the
industry-speciﬁc pseudo-R2 conditional on the industry-speciﬁcm o d e lc o e ﬃcients of Table 3,
as well as the pseudo-R2 calculated conditional on the economy-wide model coeﬃcients. The
results are displayed in Table 5.
First, starting with the pseudo-R2 for the models with industry-speciﬁcc o e ﬃcients and
comparing the in-sample and out-of-sample results reported in Tables 3 and 5, respectively, we
see that the explanatory power out-of-sample is in fact either higher than in-sample or unchanged
in ﬁve out of ten industries. The lower panel of Table 5 shows, for the economy-wide model,
that the explanatory power has increased substantially from 0.35 to 0.39.I n t h e t h r e e c a s e s
21where the pseudo-R2 decreases (hotel and restaurant, transportation and real-estate), it does so
only marginally.
Next we turn to the pseudo-R2 for the predictions based on the economy-wide model coeﬃ-
cients. In the lower panel of Table 5, we see, relative to Table 3, that the explanatory power has
increased in all industries except for agriculture, where it is unchanged. However, the pseudo-
R2 values generated when using industry-speciﬁcc o e ﬃcients are typically at least as large as
the ones obtained when using economy-wide model coeﬃcients, with the exception of the real-
estate sector (compare upper and lower panels of Table 5). This implies that pseudo-R2 at the
aggregate level is slightly lower for the economy-wide model compared with an aggregation of
pseudo-R2 over the industry-speciﬁc models (denoted Industry aggregate in Table 5). These
results provide support for two important conclusions. First, the industry models are not over-
parameterized. Second, the reduced-form coeﬃcients appear to be stable over time and the
regressions thus reﬂect steady relationships that hold even out-of-sample.
Third, moving on to measures of relative risk, we follow Shumway (2001). Another important
scale along which to evaluate the models is their ability to rank ﬁrms according to their riskiness
in terms of ex post default frequencies. In other words, we investigate if the estimated default
risk models assign the largest ex ante default probabilities to the riskiest ﬁrms, and vice versa
for the least risky ﬁrms. At a ﬁrst glance, we see from Table 5 that the estimated models classify
roughly 75−80 percent of the defaulting ﬁrms in the ﬁrst decile. These numbers are about the
same as those reported in-sample by Shumway for a data set that was substantially smaller
and included only listed ﬁrms. Our models cover the entire population of Swedish incorporated
businesses, of which only a very small subset is listed on the stock exchange (about 500 out of
250,000). We therefore conclude that our models are quite successful in ranking ﬁrms according
to their level of default risk. The empirical performance of the models constitutes an important
support for our conclusion that the role of macroeconomic variables in models of default risk is
not driven by the omission of key microeconomic variables.
Table 5 also reveals that the quality of the risk rankings does not depend on whether we
condition on industry-speciﬁcc o e ﬃcients or coeﬃcients from the economy-wide model. This
contrasts with our ﬁndings in the previous subsection, where we found that conditioning on
industry-speciﬁc parameters improved the models’ empirical performance at the industry level.
The explanation for these seemingly inconsistent results lies in the fact that the most important
diﬀerence between the economy-wide and industry-speciﬁcm o d e l si sm a d eu pb yt h ev a r y i n g
22impact of the aggregate factors. Those factors have little impact on the ﬁrms’ riskiness ranking
and hence their inclusion or omission has little impact on the models’ ability to risk-rank ﬁrms.27
Finally, to assess the out-of-sample properties of the models at the microeconomic level in a
more formal and absolute sense, we compare the distribution of estimated out-of-sample default
probabilities with the actual default frequencies. We do so by sorting all estimated default
probabilities according to increasing size and calculating the average probability of default in
each percentile. We then compare these percentiles with the actual default experience of these
percentiles.28 In Figure 7, we plot the result where we have used both the industry-speciﬁca n d
the economy-wide model coeﬃcients in Table 3 to compute the estimated default probabilities
for each ﬁrm. On the x-axis, we have the estimated default frequency in a given percentile,
and on the y-axis, we have the actual default frequency in each percentile. In the ﬁgure each
dot is a percentile, and in order to make the results easier to access, a logarithmic scale is used
for both the estimated and actual series. If the estimated models could perfectly predict the
absolute riskiness of the ﬁrms within each percentile, all dots would line up along the 45-degree
line drawn in the ﬁgures, which has a slope of unity and intercept equal to nil. As can be seen
in Figure 7, this is not the case for either model, but the dots are generally very close to the
line, suggesting that the absolute riskiness ranking is very accurate. In particular, the models
that include macroeconomic factors appear to better capture the absolute risk level, since the
models without macroeconomic variables tend to overestimate default risk. The mean standard
deviations from the 45-degree line (in logarithmic scale) are 0.82 and 0.90 for the upper and lower
left panels (no macro variables) and 0.63 for both the upper and lower right panels (with macro
variables). However, since the standard errors for the industry aggregate and economy-wide
model (that both condition on macroeconomic factors) are about the same, the results suggest
that aggregation of the industry-speciﬁc models does not outperform the economy-wide model
in this dimension. This conﬁrms our previous ﬁndings: it is suﬃcient to condition on aggregate
factors in the economy-wide model to obtain an acceptable model at the aggregate level, but
industry-speciﬁc models are typically superior for predicting default risk at the industry level.
27 In a given quarter, aggregate shocks have zero inﬂuence on the ranking because they aﬀect the default
probabilities equally much by the way the estimated models are constructed.
28 It would have been very interesting to report results for the diﬀerent industries as well, but there are not
enough defaults out-of-sample to split up the data in percentiles for each industry.
235C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper, we study the interaction between macroeconomic ﬂuctuations and default risk at
the ﬁrm level using reduced-form methods. To this end we collected a large panel data set for
the Swedish economy during 1990−2002, a period covering a deep recession, and an associated
banking crisis in the early 1990s, followed by a boom in the latter part of the 1990s, as well as
a downturn in the beginning of the 2000s. We divided the sample in two parts, 1990 − 1999
and 2000 − 2002. We use the former period for model estimation and the latter to provide
an assessment of whether the impact of aggregate ﬂuctuations on default risk, over and above
ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables, is a robust regularity valid for the entire sample period.
We present four main ﬁndings. First, we provide insight into the signiﬁcance of aggregate
ﬂuctuations for defaults among not only listed but even privately held ﬁrms. This is of sig-
niﬁcance, since privately held businesses typically account for over half of GDP in developed
economies. Second, a nearly exhaustive set of ﬁrm-speciﬁc background variables permits us to
investigate the importance of and interaction between ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables and macroeconomic
information - a nearly unexplored area. Third, we document that a simple logit approach to
model default at the ﬁrm level, using both ﬁrm-speciﬁc and macroeconomic variables, can ex-
plain the peaking default frequencies during the Swedish banking crisis of the early 1990s as well
as well for the considerably lower default frequencies in the late 1990s. The length of our panel
enables us to do extensive out-of-sample performance tests of our model. The estimated models
are shown to be very robust and successful out-of-sample, suggesting that aggregate ﬂuctuations
play a truly prominent role in understanding the absolute level of ﬁrm default risk. Finally, the
width of our panel permits us to investigate the relation between aggregate ﬂuctuations and
ﬁrm defaults across industries. This shows that macroeconomic variables have a robust and
"structural" impact on business defaults.
We do not interpret our results as implications of aggregate ﬂuctuations being the most
important source of default at the ﬁrm level. Rather, we argue that the results suggest that
macroeconomic factors shift the mean of the default risk distribution over time and thereby are
the most important source of the level of default risk.
In view of these results, we conclude by providing some suggestions as to why aggregate
ﬂuctuations should be expected to have a statistically important impact on ﬁrm default behav-
ior, over and above the eﬀect that ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables, which themselves move in response to
macroeconomic ﬂuctuations, have. Hackbarth, Miao and Morellec (2006) argue that the depen-
24dence of cash ﬂows on economic conditions lead to ﬁrms’ optimal default thresholds being aﬀected
by aggregate shocks. Hence aggregate ﬂuctuations can trigger simultaneous defaults. Another
argument for why aggregate variables might contain predictive information for ﬁrm-default risk
over and above the ﬁrm-speciﬁc information is related to the costliness of monitoring. If mon-
itoring borrowers is costly for banks, then banks may use aggregate information to assess the
probability of getting repayment on loans granted. That is, banks may form their credit-granting
policies on the basis of macroeconomic forecasts and decide to not extend new lines of credit to
ﬁrms with a given set of performance indicators in one particular phase of the business cycle,
but readily do so in another phase. In other words, banks resort to using the macroeconomic
stance in their decision processes. Yet another argument follows a similar line of reasoning. If
entrepreneurs have imperfect information about their own future business prospects, they may
resort to using aggregate conditions as a basis for their decision to either invest more eﬀort in
a ﬁrm or declare bankruptcy. In addition, if ﬁrms are borrowing-constrained, then the nominal
interest rate will be an important and direct determinant of default risk. A ﬁnal possibility is
that ﬁrms may be inclined to adjust their yearly accounts to, e.g., smooth proﬁto v e rt i m ei n
order to please banks’ monitoring eﬀorts, and thereby reduce the predictive power of ﬁrm-level
information. We believe that formalizing the theory of how macroeconomic variables aﬀect ﬁrm
defaults and assessing the empirical plausibility of the arguments above are important issues for
future research.
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296D a t a a p p e n d i x
As mentioned in Section 2.1, the default deﬁnition we adopt is the following: a ﬁrm is con-
sidered to have a default status once any of the following events occurs: the ﬁrm is declared
legally bankrupt, has suspended payments, has negotiated a debt composition settlement, is
undergoing a re-construction, or is distraint without assets. The data we use to construct the
default variable have been provided by Upplysningscentralen AB (UC), the main Swedish credit
bureau, that is jointly owned by (most of) the Swedish banks. UC taps its information from
Tingsrätten,D i s t r i c tC o u r t ,Bolagsverket, the Swedish Companies Registration Oﬃce (SCRO),
and Kronofogdemyndigheten, the Swedish Enforcement Authority.
UC stores information on minor and major distress events in two diﬀerent databases, AM and
JP. In the ﬁrst database, variable names are constructed by giving each event the name AMTYP,
a Swedish acronym for remark type, and an integer number suﬃx. For example, AMTYP12 is
a dummy variable that indicates if a ﬁrm has suspended its payments. The variables we use to
construct our default variable are "declared bankrupt," "declared minor bankruptcy," "suspen-
sion of payments," "debt composition settlement decided," "company reconstruction started,"
"company reconstruction concluded," and "distraint without assets." The second database con-
tains further information, 27 variables in all, on various milestones and stages in a broader
category of major (mostly but not exclusively distress) events for each registered ﬁrm. The
foremost variables we use from this database are related to legal bankruptcy: "bankruptcy pro-
cedures started," "bankruptcy procedures concluded," "bankruptcy procedures concluded with
a surplus," "bankruptcy procedures continued," and "declared bankrupt." In addition we use:
"negotiations on a debt composition settlement started," and "negotiations on a debt composi-
tion settlement concluded."
If any of the above distress-event dummy variables equals one at some moment in our sample
period, the ﬁrm in question is considered to have defaulted in that particular quarter. In the
following quarter, we let the ﬁrm exit our data set. If more than one of these distress events are
observed for a speciﬁc ﬁrm over our sample period, we assume the ﬁrm in question has defaulted
in the quarter during which the ﬁrst of these events took place. An additional variable we use
from the second data set indicates if a "bankruptcy [was] cancelled" by a court. Over the whole
sample period (i.e., in-sample and out-of-sample) this occurs 11 times, and seven of these 11
events relate to ﬁrms that default later on. We treat ﬁrms for which the bankruptcy status was
cancelled by the District Court as healthy until the data indicate otherwise. Moreover, we let
30ﬁrms that default but re-emerge from their default status exit the data set after the quarter in
which default takes place; they re-enter in the quarter in which UC registered that the default
status had been "removed."
Our decision to let ﬁrms that default exit the data set in the subsequent quarter is based on
the following statistics: of all 123,023 defaults in our whole data set 117,481 are terminal in the
sense that no new information on the ﬁrms is added to any of the databases.29 The remaining
observations concern ﬁrms that default twice within the sample period. Of these observations,
3,555 defaults are terminal at the second occurrence, while 107 re-emerge even after the second
default. No ﬁrm defaults more than two times within our sample period.
Of the 117,481 ﬁrst-time-is-terminal defaults 111,702 are legal bankruptcy declarations. For
about 45 percent of these ﬁrms another default-triggering distress event occurs simultaneously,
i.e. during the same quarter, in our data. In most cases this is the variable "bankruptcy
proceedings started." Nearly all of the remaining terminal defaults, i.e., those that are not
bankruptcies, are associated with "distraint, no assets." The remaining distress events account
for less than 1 percent of the ﬁrst-time-is-terminal defaults.
For the ﬁrms that re-emerge after a default, the ﬁrst default involves a legal bankruptcy in less
than half a percent of all cases and "distraint, no assets" in 98 percent. At their second default,
these percentages are reversed for the terminal defaults. Among the ﬁrms that experience a
second non-terminal default, 98 percent cause their second default by obtaining the "distraint,
no assets" status.
29Firms that are declared bankrupt at some point do not disappear from the databases that UC maintains.
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Figure 2: Macro data used in the estimated models.0
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